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small-open-economy, DSGE-based, New-Keynesian model. Allowing for some ination inertia, we de-
velop a small-open-economy version of the Calvo sticky-price model to investigate the relative ability of
IT, PT and HT to minimize the variability in domestic ination and the output gap. Our analyses show
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, many developed economies have been radically transformed. These countries,
after shifting to a new monetary policy regime, now show a low rate of ination, a declining public and
external debt, and the private sector is more concerned about costs as well as more productive and efcient
than during the 1990's. Because of unsatisfactory monetary policy performance, countries such New Zealand,
Canada, Australia, Sweden and U.K. introduced policies targeting ination rate to achieve price stability.
Still controversial is the denition of the price stability and how to achieve it. Indeed, The denition of price
stability remains unclear. The debate has mainly focused on whether the ination rate or the price-level path
should be the policy target. More specically, under ination targeting (hereafter, IT), the central bank tries
to bring the ination rate to the target, while it aims to bring the price level to the initial level of the price
index at the time the regime is established with price-level targeting (hereafter, PT). An alternative method
considers a hybrid target (hereafter, HT), based on a weighted average of an ination target and price-level
target. This paper addresses this particular issue in a small open economy setting.
The difference between the three regimes can be captured in their effects on price level. The IT regime
aims to maintain a stable path for future ination even if this leads to a unit root (non stationarity) in the
price level. The PT regime imply a stable path for price level leading at the same time to a stationary price
level around the targeted value and a stationary ination rate around zero. The hybrid regime combines the
characteristics of IT and PT by incorporating an average of ination and price level target, this policy (HT)
targets an average ination of several forthcoming periods rather than targeting one-period ahead (IT) or
innite horizon (PT).
The present work lays out a small-open-economy model with Calvo-type staggered price setting. More-
over, the benchmark model allows for some ination inertia by including price indexation to past ination.
Introducing price indexation results in a lagged ination term in the price equation and, therefore, a better t
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for ination persistence. The resulting specication enables us to focus on the monetary-policy implications
of different regimes, namely ination targeting, price-level targeting and hybrid targeting. We also address
the welfare implications of these policy regimes.
Our results suggest that allowing for some base drift in the price level (HT), small-open-economy welfare
is improved. Indeed, these ndings are consistent with the fact that hybrid ination/price-level targeting
performs well and provides an alternative method for conducting successful monetary policy in the case of
a small-open economy, without the shortcomings of the other monetary-policy regimes considered in this
work (IT and PT). Following a hybrid targeting rule, a central bank generates lower variabilities in domestic
ination and output gap, and reports signicant benets when adopting this regime.
Ination Rate Versus Price-Level Target: The Debate
Throughout the last decade, ination targeting was widely adopted as a framework for monetary policy.
Several industrialized countries formally or informally adopted IT targeting and, thus far, most enjoy low in-
ation,1 price stability and satisfactory real-growth records.2 In contrast, 'conventional wisdom', as Svensson
(1999) called it, has been sceptical of price-level targeting. The main argument against PT is that it induces
both higher short-run ination and output variability compared to IT (see Fischer, 1994, Haldane and Salmon,
1995). However, Dittmar et al. (1999) and Svensson (1999) argue that PT has advantages over IT, since, with
PT ination, variability becomes lower, assuming output variability is at least moderately persistent.3 The
controversy mainly concerns the denition of price stability and more particularly how price stability can be
maintained in practice. For instance, monetary authorities should choose paths for either price level or the
ination rate allowing, in the latter case, for a base drift in the price level.4
1A survey of literature on the economic performance of ination-targeting countries is presented in Svensson (1995) Haldane (1995)
and Bernanke et al. (1999).
2Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and other industrialized countries have adopted an IT regime.
3Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2000) argue that price-level targeting yields better output-ination variability trade-off and price
stability than does ination targeting.
4The rst known example of an implicit target for price stability was in terms of price-level targeting, as adopted by Sweden in the
1930s (see Berg and Jonung, 1999).
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More recently, Nessen and Vestin (2000) and Nessen (2002) suggest the central bank should target average
ination over several periods. Batini and Yates (2003), Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobayashi (2004)
investigate another novel proposal that combines IT and PT in a mixed regime, called hybrid ination/price-
level targeting. In this proposal, ination volatility becomes lower when compared to PT and IT regimes.
Indeed, Batini and Yates (2003) introduce a new perspective on the analysis of price-level and ination
targets by considering a hybrid target, which is a weighted average of an ination target and a price-level
target. They do not, however, use a utility-based, welfare-loss function as an evaluation criterion. In their
analysis of price-level versus ination targeting under different model specications, policy rules, and loss
functions of the central bank, Batini and Yates (2003) nd that the more forward-looking the model, the less
noticeable the difference between the reaction functions of ination and price-level targeting, thus making
the performance of such rules highly dependent on the degree of forward-looking behaviour. Using Fuhrer
and Moore (1995)'s model to explore the implications of these regimes for the United Kingdom, Batini and
Yates (2003) examine both a set of simple rules feeding back from alternative combinations of price-level
and ination deviations from a given target and a set of optimal control rules obtained under the assumption
that policy makers minimize a loss function which penalizes a mixed price-level/ination target.5 Despite
the contribution of these theoretical works, however, few studies have directly evaluated the HT regime using
open-economymodels. An analysis of HT in a small-open-economy environment is relevant, especially given
the IT- and PT-regimes' shortcomings, as well as the implications of these weaknesses for central banks.
Our work departs from the above-mentioned literature in at least two dimensions, extending the works
of Batini and Yates (2003) and Kobayashi (2004). First, we consider a New-Keynesian environment com-
bined with ination inertia where the model's dynamics are enriched by allowing for price indexation rather
than considering them only in a pure Calvo-staggered fashion. Second, we use a utility-based, welfare-loss
5Batini and Yates (2003) explored the implications of the HT regime using a reduced form of the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model
which is not built on microfoundations that are as compelling as the Calvo model. Like the original Taylor model, the Fuhrer-Moore
model is based on some arbitrary but supercially plausible assumptions about the form of labour contracts (Mankiw, 2001).
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function as an evaluation criterion to evaluate the hybrid monetary-policy regime. By combining these new
features, we obtain new insights on the price-level versus ination targeting debate. We discuss the potential
implications of these insights later in this paper.
In line with previous research on monetary-policy analysis, we adopt the New-Keynesian framework
frequently adopted in this literature.6 The most important feature of this model is the appearance of terms
that reect the forward-looking behaviour of representative agents. This leads, for example, to a stabilization-
bias problem that occurs if monetary authorities apply discretionary monetary policy (Clarida et al, 2000).
Most of the literature to date uses the new classical model to assess the properties of the HT regime and
conrms its advantages (Kobayashi, 2004). However, the use of New-Keynesian models in analyzing the HT
regime is only in its early stages.7 In this paper, we investigate this framework and provide evidence that
assists in discriminating between hybrid regimes and other kinds of monetary-policy targeting.
The small-open-economy representation considers the possibility that international trade and nancial
assets affect the evolution of the domestic economy. Thus, foreign shocks, such as changes in the terms of
trade, can alter domestic business-cycle uctuations, giving rise to further dynamics within the model. This,
in turn, may lead the monetary authority to explicitly take these kinds of uctuations into account (Lubik and
Schorfheide, 2003).8
Recent developments in New-Open-Economy Macroeconomics, originating with Obstfeld and Rogof
(1995), have led to a wealth of literature in which micro-founded and optimization-based models are used for
policy analysis in the open economy.9 These studies highlight the role of the terms of trade in the transmission
of business cycles (see Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
6See for example McCallum and Nelson (2000), Clarida et al. (2000), Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000) for a discussion of this
framework.
7Dittmar et al. (1999) Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobayashi (2004) analyzed the hybrid regime using a model similar to Svens-
son's (1999) model. Batini and Yates (2003) explored the implications of this regime using the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model.
8Domestic policy decisions do not impact the rest of the world, allowing us to abstract from strategic interactions between the
domestic economy and the rest of the world.
9See Lane (2001) for a survey.
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Galí and Monacelli (2005)10 consider a small-open-economy version of the Calvo sticky-price model and
show how equilibrium dynamics are reduced to a simple representation in domestic ination and the output
gap. The model used here further explores this avenue and extends Gali and Monacelli's (2005) framework
to account for HT targeting. We use the resulting setting to analyze the macroeconomic implications of three
alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small-open economy: A CPI-ination-based Taylor rule, pure
price-level targeting, and a hybrid- ination/price-level-based rule.
In our empirical work, we use the New Keynesian framework in a calibrated DSGE model, applying
the hybrid monetary-policy rule. We calibrate key parameters to match some broad characteristics of the
Canadian data. Since analytical solutions are often not available for this regime and empirical literature has
not reached a consensus about key parameters, we rely on a calibrated model. Subsequently, we conduct a
welfare analysis of the various monetary-policy regimes considered in this study and compare their impulse-
response functions.
The paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 2 sketches the model's derivation as suggested
by the microfoundations presented by Gali and Monacelli (2005). Section 3 provides details on the quan-
titative methodology and discusses the results. Section 4 introduces welfare analysis, provides the results,
and conducts a sensitivity analysis over various parameter congurations. Section 5 presents the concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
We construct a model that is a variant of a dynamic New-Keynesian model applied to a small-open economy,
following Clarida et al (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). In order to make this paper self-contained, key
structural equations are presented in this section.
The model has three sectors: 1) a continuum of prot-maximizing, monopolistically-competitive rms
10The authors develop a tractable optimizing model of a small open economy with staggered price setting à la Calvo to analyze three
interest rate rule: the domestic-ination-based Taylor rule, the CPI-based Taylor rule, and an exchange rate peg.
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(owned by consumers who include their shares in their portfolios) operating a constant return-to-scale tech-
nology and making staggered price decisions in the spirit of Calvo (1983); 2) an innitely-lived representative
household which maximizes a utility function dened over a composite consumption-good and labour sup-
ply;11 and 3) a central bank which sets the monetary policy through an interest rule that targets both the price
level and the ination rate in a hybrid formula.12
This section introduces the main log-linearized equilibrium conditions of the model as well as the price
setting scheme. The equilibrium dynamics for the small-open economy in terms of output gap (xt), domestic
ination (^H;t) and real interest rate (r^t) can be completed by writing a version of the 'IS curve'. In a
stationary setting, log-linearized version of this equation has the following form
xt = Etfxt+1g   1
=[(1  ) + !] (r^t   Etf^H;t+1g   rrt ); (1)
where ! = +( 1)(1 );  is the degree of openness of the economy (0 <  < 1),  is the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and imported goods ( > 0) and  is the elasticity of substitution among
goods within each category ( > 1): xt dene the output gap13 which is a deviation of domestic output (y^t)
from its 'natural' level (yt). Formally, xt = y^t  yt;where the small-open economy natural output is the level
of output that would prevail under exible prices. Et is the expectations operator conditional on time t set of
agent's information. This IS equation relates the output gap in a forward-looking equation to the interest rate,
domestic ination and the natural interest rate (rrt).
2.1 Price Setting
Price-setting behaviour follows Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) in that only a fraction (1    ) of rms adjust
their prices each period. Indeed, rms are not allowed to change their prices unless they receive a signal








12Detailed derivations and descriptions of the model are available from the corresponding author upon request. The reader is referred
to Clarida et al (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) for a general discussion about this model.
13In our model, we have to handle three denitions of output: a measure of output, natural output (which we get in an economy with
no imperfection or nominal rigidity) and nally the output gap, which is the difference between the output and the natural output.
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allowing them to re-optimize prices. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), prices set by rms
that do not receive a random price-change signal are indexed to past ination.14 Furthermore, Christiano et
al. (2005) assume that prices are fully indexed to past ination, but empirical models that allow for partial
indexation (following Smets and Wouters, 2003) often nd that the best-tting value for the degree price
indexation is positive but less than one. The partial indexation allows us to have some ination inertia,
leeway which can make the model more robust for policy and welfare analysis, especially if we are interested
in welfare evaluation of ination costs. Erceg, Henderson and Levine (2000) use indexation to the steady-
state ination rate, allowing them to compute a linearized equation for ination combining expected future
ination and lagged ination. This equation differs from the forward-looking ination process obtained under
the standard Calvo model.
Let PnH;t be the price set by rm i adjusting its price in period t and facing a probability  
k of keeping its
price unchanged for k periods (for k = 0; 1; 2; :::). P bH;t denes the price chosen by the remaining fraction
 of rms not optimally adjusting their prices at time t. The (log) price p^bH;t is set according to the simple,
backward-looking rule p^bH;t = p^H;t 1 + p^H;t 1, while the new price must satisfy the following equation
PnH;t = + (1   )
1X
k=0
( )kEtfmct+k + PH;t+kg; (2)
where p is the coefcient of price indexation,  is the steady-state markup and  is the discount factor.15
The dynamics of the domestic price index are then given by
PH;t = [ (P
b
H;t 1)
1  + (1   )(PnH;t)1 )]
1
1  (3)
which can be loglinearized to obtain an expression for the domestic ination as follows:
^H;t =  p^H;t 1 + (1   )(p^nH;t   p^H;t 1): (4)
14Price indexation makes the price dispersion between individual prices of the monopolistic rms much smaller compared with
constant price-setting behaviour, a factor which has important consequences for monetary-policy evaluation. See Rabanal and Rubio-
Ramírez, 2005, for a general discussion about price indexation.
15The forward-looking pricing decision is related to the fact that rms that adjust their price in any period do so for a random number
of periods. The price is then set as a markup over the average of expected future marginal costs.
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Combining (4) with the differentiated version of (3) yields the aggregate supply equation
^H;t =

1 +  p
Etf^H;t+1g+
p




where  = (1  )(1  )= (1+ p),
f
mctrepresents the log-deviation of the real marginal cost. Equation
(5) shows that the domestic ination dynamic has both forward-looking and backward-looking components.
The real marginal costs faced by the rms are also an important determinant of domestic ination. Note
that with p = 0, this equation reverts to the standard open-economy supply equation. Moreover, assuming
that the degree of price stickiness  is identical across economies, the rms in the rest of the world (ROW)
face simple Calvo-style price-setting behaviour. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume,
throughout our analysis, that the degree of price indexation in the ROW p is equal to zero.16
2.2 Monetary Policy
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor-type
interest-rate rule. In its simple version introduced by the inuential work by Taylor (1993), an interest rate
feedback from output and ination is used to approximate monetary policy. Recently Woodford (2000)
demonstrated that the interest rate rule is consistent with nominal demand determinacy for forward-looking
models. In addition, in an open-economy model, the exchange rate is affected by the difference between
domestic and foreign nominal interest rates and expected future exchange rates, via an interest rate parity
condition (Svensson, 1998). The real exchange rate will then affect the relative price of domestic and foreign
goods, which in turn affects both domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods and hence contributes to
movements in CPI ination. Likewise, the exchange rate affects the domestic currency prices of imported
nal goods included in the CPI price. In this way, monetary policy can affect both the CPI price and the CPI
ination rate. Consequently, when analyzing our model under HT targeting, we consider a monetary rule that
incorporates both the price level and the ination rate.
16Setting p so that it is equal to the domestic price-indexation coefcient (or p 6= 0) does not signicantly change the policy-
evaluation results.
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In the present paper, we analyze the macroeconomic implications of three alternative monetary-policy
regimes for the small-open economy: a policy that aims at fully stabilizing CPI ination (IT), a policy that
stabilizes CPI price level (PT) and a policy that combines price-level and ination targeting (HT).
As a means of focusing on these target rules, we rst begin by dening each rule. We next turn to the
quantitative results of the model.
Ination Targeting
Ination targeting is the policy which responds to deviations of the CPI ination rate from the target and
acts to stabilize the CPI ination rate around the ination-target path. IT involves, then, price-level drift and
consequently price non stationarity. We adopt a Taylor rule representation (Taylor 1993) where the interest
rate (r^t) reacts to ination deviations from its target (^t) and output deviations from potential (output gap,
xt), that is r^t =  + ^t + yxt; where ;  and y are policy parameters. We analyze the properties of
the equilibrium of the small open-economy when this policy rule is used and compare its performance with
PT and HT.
Price-Level Targeting
Price-level targeting itself is a policy that systematically responds to deviations of the CPI price index from a
predetermined long-run path. PT is then a policy stabilizing the price level (p^t) around the target path, which
implies stationarity for the price index and an ination rate around zero ination. In our analysis, we consider
PT with a xed price-level target (steady-state price level, P ), i.e. Pt = P or in log deviation p^t = 0. Thus
PT yields price-level stability around the steady-state price and zero ination.
Hybrid Targeting
A hybrid ination/price-level targeting policy combines elements of both previous regimes. This regime
embeds both an ination target and a price-level target, allowing therefore for some base drift in the price
10
path. As in Batini and Yates (2003), we assume that the monetary policy follows the generalized hybrid
ination/price-level target
r^t = Etf^t+1g+ p(Etp^t   p^t 1) + yxt, (6)
where r^t denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, ^t; p^t are dened in the same way as above, and xt
is the output gap.  2 [0; 1] is the key parameter that denes the spectrum of targets between price-level
and ination targeting. For 0 <  < 1 the target is a hybrid regime targeting both the price-level and the
ination-rate level.17
The degree of price-level drift, , in Batini and Yates' [2003] model is treated as a choice variable for
the government and no optimal value for this parameter is derived by the authors. However, Røisland (2006)
shows that, within a model with ination inertia due to price indexation, an HT regime can be adopted to
achieve optimal policy identical to the optimal policy under commitment if the monetary authority sets the
degree of price-level drift equal to the degree of price indexation. Hence, the optimal degree of price-level
drift in the HT rule is equal to the degree of price indexation.
As in Galí and Monacelli (2005), we assume that the world monetary authority succeeds in fully stabiliz-
ing world prices and the output gap; hence, we assume y^t = t = 0 for all t which is an optimal policy for
the closed economy under our assumptions.18
2.3 Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
Price stickiness is the only source of suboptimality in the equilibrium allocation. Indeed, as shown by Galí and
Monacelli (2005), the employment subsidy neutralizes the market power distortion and by not assigning any
explicit value to monetary holding balances, the monetary distortion that would pull monetary policy towards
the Friedman rule is eliminated. Ination inertia is also introduced in the model by the price behaviour.
17We only consider this scheme in our analysis, i.e. 0 <  < 1. We then study the welfare implications of varying  in the unit
interval.
18The reader is referred to Clarida et al. (2000 and 2002) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) for the derivation of such a rule and its
optimality for closed economy version of the model.
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The resulting model is then consistent with what has been termed the NKPC. The determination of the real
marginal cost as a function of domestic output (y^t) and foreign output (y^t ) is complex due to the wedge
between some aggregate variables, namely output versus consumption and domestic price versus consumer
price indexes. We indeed have
^
mct =   + w^t   p^H;t   a^t
=   + y^t + y^t + s^t   (1 + )a^t; (7)
where w^t; s^t and y^t stand respectively for the deviation of wage rate from its steady-state value, the devi-
ations of the terms-of-trade and the foreign output from their steady-state values. p^H;t is the log-deviation
of domestic price level and a^t is a total-factor productivity index driven by an AR(1) exogenous stochastic
process, a^t = aa^t 1 + "a;t, where "a;t is a white noise with mean 0 and variance 2 .  =   log(1   );
where  is an employment subsidy created to exactly compensate for the monopolistic competition dis-
tortion. The employment subsidy exactly offsets the combined effects of the rm's market power and the
terms-of-trade distortions in the steady-state. In this case, there is only one effective distortion left in the
small-open-economy model, namely sticky prices.
According to (7), real marginal cost is increasing as concerns the terms of trade, domestic output and
world output and is decreasing with regards to technology. Hence, the wealth and employment effects on real
wages, combined with the changes in the product wage and then the impacts on real wages lead to changes
in marginal cost through its direct effect on labour productivity. Real marginal cost is then, given by
^
mct = ( + )xt; (8)
which we can combine with equation (5) to derive a NKPC in terms of the output gap
^H;t =

1 +  p
Etf^H;t+1g+
p
1 +  p
^H;t 1 + xt; (9)
where  = ( + ): Notice that with the degree of openness () and the coefcient of price indexation p
set to zero (i.e.  = 0 and p = 0), equation (9) reverts to the standard, purely forward-looking, NKPC. The
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relation (9) also makes it clear that the standard formulation of NKPC based on the output gap assumes no
price indexation to past ination, and hence there is no ination inertia in the model.
Furthermore, we assume that the foreign country pursues an optimal policy, implying a constant foreign-
price level at equilibrium.19 The model's dynamics can be stable in this case, even with non-stationary prices.
In the following sections, we will rst set the model parameters as calibrated to the Canadian economy,




Baseline calibration of the model is based on recent literature and closely follows Galí and Monacelli (2005).
The parameter values used in this study reect Canadian data.
We use a labour supply elasticity of about 1=3 which sets  = 3 and a steady-state markup  = 1:2,
meaning that the elasticity of substitution between different domestic goods  is 6. Following Galí and
Gertler (1999), we use the standard value of 0:75 to calibrate the sticky-price parameter  this implies an
average price adjustment period of 4 quarters. The degree of openness of the economy  is set to 0:4. The
discount factor  is assumed to equal 0:99 and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods  takes the value 1:5 according to Backus et al. (1995).
The remaining parameters are somewhat difcult to determine, due to lack of consensus amongst open-
economy researchers about the values attributed to the intertemporal rate of substitution . Cochrane (1997)
uses values between one and two, Yun (1996) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) calibrate their models with
 = 1:We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and set this parameter to 1:5.
The price indexation parameter characterizes the backward-looking component in the NKPC. A 0:5 value
19See Galí and Monacelli (2004) for a discussion of optimal policy in the foreign-country and SOE cases.
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for this parameter is frequently found in empirical estimates of the NKPC (see for example Smets, 2003).
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) use indexation to the
past period's ination rate, but set the indexation parameter to one (i.e. full indexation). In contrast, estimates
reported by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Sahuc (2004) using U.S. and Euro area data show that p ranges
from 0:40 to 0:64 with larger values for the U.S. case.20 The latter authors argue that partial indexation is
data consistent and appears to capture ination dynamics. Following Justiniano and Preston (2007), who
estimated a small-open-economy model similar to one we study in this paper (using Canadian data), this
parameter is set at p = 0:55; so that the backward-looking coefcient is 0:40 and the forward-looking term
is 0:71 in the price equation.
Parametrization of the policy-rule set p, y21 and  to 0:5. As discussed in Batini and Yates, setting a
value to the  parameter is quite difcult. Using a range of values within the interval [0,1] the authors show
that the value of  depends on the size of the ination tax, the cost of indexation and the length of nominal
contracts but they do not however derive an optimal value for this coefcient. As stated above, we set  equal
to the degree of price indexation to past ination.
Using Canadian labour productivity for the period 1963Q01 - 2002Q04 as a proxy for domestic produc-
tivity, Galí and Monacelli (2005) estimate the stochastic properties of technology shock to be a = 0:66 with
a standard deviation of about one percent. Finally, we use these estimates and set the residual correlation to
zero, i.e. corr("a;t; "a;t) = 0: See Table 1 for a summary of model-parameter values.
3.2 Impulse Response Functions and Second Moment Analysis
Impulse response functions (IRFs) play an important role in describing the impact that shocks have on macro-
economic variables. To further understand this role, we simulate the IRFs of the main variables using three
20Leith and Malley (2003) estimate an open-economy NKPC for the G7 countries, using a model with backward-looking behaviour.
They nd that this parameter ranges from 0.54 in some countries up to as high as 0.87 in others.
21In the original Taylor rule, the weights on the output gap and ination are set to the standard weight of 0.5, which is common in the
literature.
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rules : IT, PT and HT. The results are reported in Figures 1 to 3, and display impulse responses up to 15
quarters. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses to a one percent positive technology shock under HT, IT
and PT regimes. The output gap response function exhibits the same patterns for all three regimes, with a
hump-shaped pattern and initial negative responses ranging from  1:4 (IT) to  0:3 percent (PT). The peaks
are reached after three to ve quarters, and then the IRFs revert slowly to steady-state. Ination responses
(domestic and CPI-based ination) display different patterns depending on the policy targeted. While do-
mestic ination has approximately the same response as the output gap under HT and IT, the IRF under PT
is quite different. Domestic ination shows a small variation under PT, starting with an initial value of  0:3;
reaching a 0:2 percent peak in about 1.5 periods and then rapidly reverting to the steady-state. The response
of CPI ination under PT is at at the steady-state level. This is because the price targeting rule imposes a
path for the price level at its steady-state value, which prevents both CPI and domestic ination from dis-
playing more variability when the model is hit by a transitory technology shock. The main difference occurs
when the initial response to the shock is highlighted. The initial value is zero for CPI ination under the HT
regime and negative under IT with hump-shaped responses. Therefore, the monetary authority has the same
response under all three rules, stabilizing ination when the technology shock occurs.
The same patterns are displayed by the domestic and CPI price-level responses with a hump-shaped
domestic price response under HT and IT. The unit root in the price level is then mirrored by the unit root
in the exchange rate. However, the responses of those three variables are quite different during HT and IT
targeting, where after a while the path reverts to initial values. The initial fall in the domestic and CPI price
responses under HT and IT are followed by hump-shaped patterns (more pronounced for IT targeting) with
a slow increase toward steady-state values. Furthermore, the impact on foreign aggregates is negligible by
construction, implying that the world interest rate remains unchanged. An anticipated domestic currency
appreciation is induced by the uncovered parity (UIP). Thus, the exchange rate depreciation explains the
paths followed by the ination rates that rise in the shock period and then revert back to initial levels.
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The nominal interest rate shows a different response. With an initial negative response to the shock,
it increases in a hump-shaped pattern to attain a peak in about ve periods and then returns to steady-state
values under all regimes. Intuitively, this means that after the economy has been hit by a technology shock, the
optimal monetary authority response increases the nominal interest rate by a larger amount than the increase
in ination, resulting in an initial increase in the real interest rate level.
The terms of trade and net exports display similar paths, with initial positive responses and decreases
persistently to reach steady-state values. This yields to a stationary behaviour for those variables, which is
dened as a property of the model. The nominal exchange rate moves in the wrong direction, especially
under HT and PT.22
The dynamic effects of foreign technology shocks are displayed in Figure 2. In this case, the foreign
monetary authority reacts to shocks by lowering the world interest rate to stabilize ination. The domestic
authorities react in the same way by reducing their own interest rate to counteract the real appreciation caused
by the foreign policy,23 followed by a gradual depreciation until both interest rates converge to their steady-
state levels.
The output gap and domestic ination responses display hump-shaped patterns under all targeting rules.
CPI ination responses are different given the rule followed by the monetary authority. While the terms-of-
trade variable is more stable under HT and PT targeting, responses persistently remain above initial levels
under IT targeting. The same patterns are displayed for net exports under the three regimes.
Under IT, the decline in domestic and CPI prices is more accentuated. The nominal interest rate response
takes the hump-shaped form and then reverts to the initial value. The main difference between home and
foreign technology shock responses is registered for the exchange rate while the response under all regimes
persistently remains above the initial levels.
22One can believe that monetary contraction generates appreciation for the domestic currency. Thus, capital outows cause demand
for foreign exchange to increase and not to fall, as is the case here, especially under PT.
23With our earlier assumption about the foreign monetary policy that stabilizes price levels at equilibrium, a reduction in the world
interest rate implies an appreciation of home currency.
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Finally, the response functions of the macro variables to unit innovations in the policy shocks reveal
that all variables display approximately the same patterns under HT and PT targeting. However, the initial
domestic and CPI price responses under IT targeting persistently remain above the steady-state levels for
more than 10 periods and then revert to the steady-state. Interestingly, the gure shows persistent exchange
rate responses slightly below the initial values for all regimes. This is explained by the negligible effect
of the policy innovations on foreign variables. A rise in the nominal interest rate is followed by an instant
currency appreciation and an anticipated depreciation since the world interest rate remains unchanged. Asset
and goods generate such movements in exchange rate and price levels.
In order to conclude the quantitative analysis for the three regimes, the second moments for some macro
variables are shown in Table 2. For each variable, we report standard deviation in percentage points.
The second moment analysis conrms the IRF visual analyses. The IT regime requires more volatility in
CPI and domestic price levels compared to the other regimes. Terms of trade are more stable under IT. Their
volatility is about two times lower than that for the PTs. Intuitively, under IT the price level should follow the
I(1) process. Hence, price adjustment after the occurrence of shocks is carried out very sluggishly, leading to
sluggish inationary behaviour. In fact, lagged price levels have little direct inuence on current price levels.
Upon shocks the price adjustment inevitably experiences sharp ination uctuation. Furthermore, the hybrid
target can be set taking into account both ination and its corresponding price level, such that past price levels
affect current price levels, but their inuence is not as strong as under IT. The price level path will lie between
those under IT and PT. As pointed out by Kobayashi (2004), implementing hybrid targeting leads to relatively
moderate ination volatility by appropriately incorporating both the sluggish nature of ination adjustment
under IT and the rapid nature of ination response under PT. These ndings align with the results obtained
by Galí and Monacelli (2005).
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4 Welfare Analysis of Alternative Regimes
The analysis of welfare implications under different monetary policy rules has become an important eld
of study (Taylor, 1999). Investigating the welfare implications of the hybrid regime and comparing them to
other monetary-policy targeting schemes considered in this work would thus be worthwhile.
A welfare-maximizing central bank may target CPI ination, CPI price or a combination of specic price
and ination paths. The key difference in approaches to ination/price-level targeting concerns a stable,
long-run price level compared to maintaining a particular rate of ination. These rule-based approaches
have different welfare implications. Devereux and Engel (2000) and Aoki (2001) show that in a closed
economy with sticky prices and backward-looking behaviour, optimal policy entails the perfect stabilization
of the ination rate. In fact, Svensson (1999) shows that if the monetary authority has a price-level targeting
objective, ination variability may be reduced without affecting output variability. This 'free-lunch' result
depends on substantial endogenous output persistence in the New-Classical Philips curve. Dittmar and Gavin
(2000) extend this analysis to the case where expectations are forward-looking in a New-Keynesian Philips
curve. They show that the free-lunch argument applies without the need for persistence terms. Thus, assigning
a price-level targeting objective, the central bank appears to improve welfare if expectations are forward-
looking or if there is substantial endogenous persistence. Vestin (2000) argues that in a purely forward-
looking model, price-level targeting provides more efcient outcomes than ination targeting. Concerning a
closed-economy model, Nessen and Vestin (2000) suggest that hybrid targeting leads to better outcomes than
targeting ination only, if the Philips curve has forward-and backward-looking components.
Our study focus on a small open economy model with a Phillips curve showing both backward and for-
ward looking behaviour. The evaluation of household welfare in this case can be expressed as a fraction of
steady-state consumption.24 Here we follow Galí and Monacelli (2005), who derive a second-order approx-
24The application of the quadratic approximation of the objective function is complex and cannot be simply derived in an open-
economy model with sticky prices. A popular measure thus uses ination and output gap volatility, in addition to the utility function.
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imation to the domestic consumer utility function in a SOE model.25 This second order approximation,26
expressed as a fraction of steady-state consumption, reveals that the expected welfare losses of any policy in
terms of domestic ination and output gap variances are then given by





var(^H;t) + (1 + )var(xt)]:
Using this expression,27 we can compare different monetary policies to assess their welfare implications
and highlight welfare costs among regimes.
Table 3 shows welfare losses associated with three different regimes: HT, IT and PT. We assume that
the central bank wants to minimize variations in domestic ination (^H;t). Since most of the countries that
use ination targeting are likely to target CPI ination rather than home ination (namely producer-price
ination), HT has been compared to the CPI ination targeting regime (IT in the text). Entries for loss
functions are percentage units of steady-state consumption.
In this Table, we report welfare losses under our benchmark parametrization, we present some sensitivity
analysis in Table 4. The results show that under our benchmark case, the reduction in welfare loss results
from a decrease in output and domestic ination volatility varying from an IT to an HT regime. On the other
hand, CPI ination targeting leads to a much higher level of losses in the welfare-loss function than obtained
by the two other regimes. As usually found in the literature,28 welfare losses are quantitatively small for all
regimes.
25See Appendix 4 in Galí and Monacelli (2004) for details on the welfare-loss function derivations. However, the derivation is
restricted to the special case of log utility and unit elasticity of substitution between different goods (i.e.  =  =  = 1) in deriving an
exact expression; otherwise, its derivation is more complex. We use this approximation for the purpose of comparing different regimes
without loss of generality. For more discussion about welfare analysis in the loglinearized model, refer to Kim and Kim (2003) and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
26After dropping terms independent of policy and those of high order and computing the unconditional expectation of this approxi-
mation.
27Recently, Røisland (2006) has shown that under the HT regime the central-bank loss function should be modied to take the form
L = (p^t   p^t 1)2 + x2t , where  is as in the text and  is a modied weight on the output gap. This assumption cannot be used
here since we aim to compare various targeting regime. We relay this case to future work.
28Kollman (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2003) are recent examples of papers in which monetary-policy welfare implications are
investigated.
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The welfare analysis can be sensitive to the parametrization of the model. We then perform a sensitivity
analysis with respect to various key parameters. Results are shown in Table 4 which have four panels. In each
panel, we report welfare losses under different policy parameter values () and of lowering, respectively, the
degree of economy openness (), the steady-state mark-up () and the elasticity of labour supply ().
Compared to the benchmark case, and using different policy parameters, the HT regime implies substan-
tially larger welfare losses as one gets closer to extreme values corresponding either to high value of  (with
 = 0:85) or low value of  (with  = 0:25). As one gets closer to the extremes, the PT targeting performs
well, lowering both ination and output gap variabilities. This nding is in line with recent studies of mone-
tary policy which show PT targeting outperforming IT targeting (see for example Svenson 1998, Vestin, 2000
and Røisland, 2006).
We next consider the effect of lowering the degree of economy openness. This has a general effect of
decreasing both domestic ination and output gap volatilities, leading to low welfare losses under all regimes.
We can interpret this to suggest that the decrease in volatilities and the resulting welfare values are essentially
generated by movements in small-open-economy variables such as terms of trade and exchange rate which
have low effects in a 'quasi-open economy' (with small ). In this case, HT and PT deliver lower welfare
losses than the IT regime.
Finally, we explore the effects of lowering both the mark-up to 1:1, which leads to a larger penalization
of ination variability in the loss function, and the elasticity of labour supply to 0:1, which implies a larger
penalization of output gap volatility. This leads to similar output gap volatility compared to the other sce-
narios, which in turn leads to an amplication of the volatility of domestic ination, further implying higher
welfare losses for all three regimes. Interestingly, the IT leads to a signicantly larger loss compared to the
two other regimes and gives a loss function value up to 10 times higher than with HT and PT. In comparison
with PT, an HT regime leads to a larger welfare loss meaning that the results may be sensitive to the model
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assumption, as pointed out by Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001).29
To conclude our welfare evaluation, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of welfare loss to the parametriza-
tion of the key policy parameter  in the hybrid rule (6): Figure 4 displays the effect in the  function of
varying this parameter from zero to one. The gure represents the peaks of welfare losses when we change
this parameter in the unit interval. In fact, the welfare-loss function takes values ranging from -4 (for  with
small values around 0) to -0.1 (for with value around and up to 1). We can conclude that this occurs because
at the limiting case of  = 0 (or  = 1) and using rule (6), the price level (ination rate) is targeted and the
ination inertia due to price indexation does not play a stabilizing role in the model. Thus, as shown by
Røisland (2006), this is similar to the complete indexation case where the optimal monetary policy is exible
ination targeting.
In closed-economy models the case for price stability is quite robust. Its desirability is associated with
the possibility of reproducing the uctuations that would arise in a exible-price world which produces a
higher welfare gain (see for instance Goodfriend and King, 2001). In open-economy models, the different
dynamics of the terms of trade, exchange rate and other foreign variables may affect the domestic agent's
welfare given a monetary policy regime. We assume that this leads to different results if the open-economy
analysis is adopted to assess welfare-maximizing monetary policy.
29The authors argue that the welfare ranking among different monetary policies may be sensitive to distortions in the economy.
21
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates hybrid ination/price-level targeting from a New-Keynesian perspective. To this end,
we calibrate generalizations of the models proposed by Monacelli (2003) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) to
the Canadian economy. Both papers develop a small-open-economy (SOE) model incorporating many of the
microfoundations appearing in a closed economy within the New-Keynesian framework (see, for instance,
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000 and Woodford, 2003) recently used for the analysis of monetary policy. The
model's open-economy version allows for the possibility that international trade in goods and nancial assets
affects the evolution of the domestic economy. This gives rise to richer dynamics within the model, given
our assumption of complete security markets. Moreover, and as shown by Galí and Monacelli (2005), the
equilibrium dynamics of the SOE model have a canonical representation, in terms of domestic ination and
output gap, analogous to that of its closed economy conterpart.30
In light of the considerable attention paid in recent macroeconomic literature to monetary-policy formu-
lations in terms of interest rate rules, we adopt this formulation to construct three regimes. In addition, we
compare the hybrid regime to the IT and PT regimes. Our results show that hybrid targeting can lead to a
successful monetary policy strategy, without any major loss in the welfare function.
Overall, an HT regime seems to be an appropriate method of conducting monetary policy if monetary
authorities seek price stability. In fact, the long-run anchor for a central bank is clearly price stability. The
problem is then whether it should target price level or variations in this price level (ination rate) or a com-
bination of the two. Notice that an ination-price-level targeting (HT) has mainly reasonable benets in that
planning and contracting become easier as nominal values approaches real values. Also, the transfers of
wealth from the private sector to the government using ination device (especially under IT) is wiped out
under both PT and HT.
Recent literature on PT shows that anchoring the price level to a long-run price-level path is a good idea
30The authors argue that the closed economy version of the model is nested in the small open economy model, as a limiting case.
22
given agents' expectations (forward and/or backward looking). However, since conservative central bankers
seem to need more time to reach this point, we believe that an intermediate way should be hybrid targeting,
and suggest more research is needed before PT can be implemented or even considered for implementation,
as is the case for example in Canada.
Likewise, in this kind of model, including more nominal rigidities, particularly sticky wages or some type
of wage indexation, should change the results obtained signicantly. Further research is therefore necessary
to establish the manner in which these frictions would likely alter this nding.
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Table 1: Model Parametrization
Parameters         p  y A A
Values assigned 1:2 3 6 1:5 1:5 0:4 0:75 0:55 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:66 1%
Table 2: Volatility Under Alternative Policy Regimes
(Standard Deviations in %)
HT Regime IT Regime PT Regime
Output Gap 0:115531 0:292549 0:221236
Domestic Ination 0:208678 0:425783 0:248183
CPI Ination 0:151996 0:231277 0:9386e 15
Nominal Interest Rate 0:174683 0:115639 0:071611
Exchange Rate 4:028806 1:472007 4:576895
CPI Price Level 0:247563 2:272017 0:000000
Domestic Price Level 0:599330 2:369227 0:693747
Terms of Trade 1:110025 0:898438 1:734369
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Table 3: Welfare Losses Under Alternative Policy Regimes: Benchmark
HT Regime IT Regime PT Regime
Benchmark  = 1:2;  = 3;  = 0:4 and  = 0:55
Var(Domestic Ination) 0:043546 0:181292 0:061595
Var(Output Gap) 0:013347 0:085585 0:048945
Welfare Loss ()  0:929222  3:904543  1:350430
Table 4: Sensitivity of Welfare Losses to Key Parameter Values
HT Regime IT Regime PT Regime
 = 1:2;  = 3;  = 0:4 and  = 0:25
Var(Domestic Ination) 0:067517 0:222545 0:057849
Var(Output Gap) 0:001193 0:004340 0:001566
Welfare Loss ()  1:417321  4:672170  1:215020
 = 1:2;  = 3;  = 0:4 and  = 0:85
Var(Domestic Ination) 0:001255 0:035528 0:019625
Var(Output Gap) 0:048605 1:295282 1:238130
Welfare Loss ()  0:084637  2:299402  1:897320
Low degree of openness  = 1:2;  = 3;  = 0:25 and  = 0:55
Var(Domestic Ination) 0:026702 0:141287 0:025688
Var(Output Gap) 0:005782 0:047865 0:019376
Welfare Loss ()  0:708635  3:775443  0:702432
Low steady-state mark-up and Low elasticity of labour supply
 = 1:1;  = 10;  = 0:4 and  = 0:55
Var(Domestic Ination) 0:177927 1:400579 0:118844
Var(Output Gap) 0:009838 0:070990 0:011315
Welfare Loss ()  3:763743  29:60564  2:529602
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Figure 4: Welfare Losses with Policy Parameter Changes
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